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ABSTRACT 
China-Africa Relations: The Northern Nigeria Textile Industry 
by Toye Afolabi Olaleye 
This project takes a critical look into China’s policy in Africa. The work assesses the 
significance and challenges of China-Africa cooperation focusing on Nigeria. The paper argued 
that analyzing the nexus between Beijing and Africa should not center on China’s investments and 
financial aid. Instead, it should reflect on the competitive hedge China enjoys through these 
investments in terms of direct access to each market sector of the African economy, and it impacts 
on local businesses. The study examines the impacts of China’s approach on the textile industry 
in Kano and Kaduna states in northern Nigeria, to provide an insight into China’s endgame in 
Africa. The study used descriptive statistics and qualitative research methods to analyze the data. 
Analyses revealed that China’s influence in Africa connects to its generous loans on 
infrastructures. Beijing’s financial help and the China-Africa development cooperation forum 
open African markets to the Chinese to engage and explore, resulting in China becoming the 
primary source of manufacturing products in Africa, such as textiles, clothing, and footwear. Data 
shows that over ninety percent (90%) materials in Kano and Kaduna markets came from China. 
The study advanced that the Nigerian government trade policy contributed to the influx of Chinese 
fabrics into northern Nigeria. The decision to rescind the ban on importing textiles in 2010 
maximized access for foreign materials to penetrate Kano and Kaduna markets when most home 
factories are barely functioning. This move plays well for the textile producers in China. With 
Nigeria being one of the China export destinations in Africa, less barrier provides direct retail 
transactions in places like Kano and Kaduna, where an informal market system synonymous with 
developing countries exists. However, this study was unable to access statistical data the shows 
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the direct implication of the influx of Chinese textiles on the level of unemployment in northern 
Nigeria, a limitation to this project. This study believes portraying China as help to Africa may not 
reflect China’s interest in the continent. The work concluded that African leaders need to set their 
priorities through trade and economy policies that are well defined.  
Keywords: China, Africa, Nigeria, Northern Nigeria, Textile Industry, Trade Policy 
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Chapter One 
1.1 Introduction 
 Since the launch of the Forum On China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China-
Africa relations have grown significantly, surpassing the United States as Africa’s largest trading 
partner. Economic cooperation has deepened due to an increase in Chinese governmental 
development assistance funds, loans, and grants for infrastructural development. These increasing 
relations have not gone without controversy; they have generated a lot of interest and concern in 
academic communities, among political leaders, diplomats, and experts. Issues of concern include 
an unfavorable balance of trade to Africa and countries heavily relying on Chinese loans to finance 
infrastructure projects. In 2017, the China-Africa Research Institute (CARI) at John Hopkins 
University put the cumulative loans from China to Africa since 2000 at $143 billion (CARI, 2019). 
China is the largest provider of “bilateral loans” to sub-Saharan Africa, putting countries who 
received these loans to high risk of “debt distress” (Grant, 2018). The risk is not in the borrowing, 
but managing the loan and putting in place plans to pay it back. Hence, concessional loans are 
viewed as a debt trap to strengthen China’s influence and benefit Chinese businesses and personnel 
in Africa (Anzetse, 2018:6). This assumption draws on the comprehensive report of how China 
used a loan deal to gain control of Port Hambantota in Sri Lanka after the government of Sri Lanka 
defaulted in loan repayments (Maria, 2019).  
Meanwhile, some scholars view China-Africa relations as a positive development, citing 
how China’s investment in infrastructures created a positive image of the Chinese government 
among the African population (Larry and Lyle, 2014; Afro barometer, 2016). Africa has a long 
history with world hegemonic powers: slave trade, colonialism, and neocolonialism. What makes 
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China’s recent endeavors different from the previous powers who continue to exploit the 
continent?  
It is imperative to recognize that China-Africa relations go beyond the provision of loans 
for infrastructural development. An analysis of such bilateral relationships’ impact should provide 
sector by sector analysis of the Chinese government and personnel in Africa. Therefore, this 
research examines the effects of China-Nigeria relations on the Nigerian manufacturing industry, 
focusing on the textile industry and how the transformations over time have affected northern 
Nigeria. Specifically, this research explores factual analysis into development cooperation 
between China and Africa from the textile industry lens in northern Nigeria.   
1.2 Problem Definition  
The textile industry used to be a booming industry in Nigeria, with remarkable export 
products and an annual growth rate of about 67 percent and 25 percent of the manufacturing 
sector’s labor force between 1960 to the late 1980s. It had about 112 factories involving in various 
productions such as spinning, weaving, and garment production in 1980. The textile industry in 
Nigeria was the largest employer after the government in 1985, with over 250,000 direct workers 
and over a million cotton farmers. (Murtala M., et al., 2018: 42). The Nigerian textile industry was 
ranked the third-largest in Africa after Egypt and South Africa, with products from factories, 
almost all sold in Nigerian and West Africa markets (Kenneth et al., 2019:4). The United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization review report of 2003 valued the Nigerian textile 
manufacturing capacity at N420 billion and investment worth of US$3 billion in 1999. The textile 
industry engaged close to thirty million people when functioning at full capacity because twenty-
six out of thirty-six Nigeria states grow cotton. (Murtala M. et al., 2018: 42-43).  
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The first textile mill established in Nigeria was in Kaduna state in northern Nigeria, the 
Kaduna Textile Limited, in 1957 under the protection of “customs tariffs” to prevent the 
importation of textile products from Europe and Japan. The tariff system remained in place until 
1977 when a ban on foreign textiles replaced it. The Kaduna factory-produced “approximately 8 
million meters of belt materials woven with Nigeria-grown cotton”. Six more mills were created 
in the city in the 1960s, including the United Nigeria Textiles Limited, Arewa Textiles, and Nortex. 
By 1985, Kaduna state had nine large textile mills. (Maiwada and Penne, 2013: 172). 
Another prominent textile city in northern Nigeria is Kano, the region's commercial hub, 
and arguably the second most productive city in Nigeria after Lagos. The textile production and 
trade are one of the state’s inhabitants’ major commercial activities, with many people engaged 
directly and indirectly. More importantly, the industry provides 30 to 35 percent of output and 
employment opportunities for the Kano state workforce (Murtala, 2018: 74). A. G. Hopkins, 
Professor of Emeritus of Commonwealth History, Cambridge University, once described Kano 
city as “the Manchester of West Africa,” home of the weaving industry (Sven, 2015:19). The first 
set of textile factories in the city opened in the 1960s, and by 1985 the city had nineteen small and 
medium-sized mills (Maiwada and Renne, 2020: 8). The exceptional beauty of textile products 
from Kano travel beyond northern Nigeria. In 1973, many Sudanese and people from other 
countries in the Sahara were buying clothing materials from the Kano market (Murtala et al., 
2019:3). However, by 2010 only twenty-four mills are operating in Nigeria, with 175 factories 
closed.  
The decline is attributed to many factors. First, the Multi-Fibre Arrangement under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on clothing and textile came to an end in 1994. 
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement was a set in 1974 that allowed both developing and developed 
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countries to control and restrict foreign textiles' importation to protect home industries. This new 
adjustment policy on foreign textiles importation was adopted by Nigeria, being a GATT member 
since November 1960 before it was replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, in 
which Nigeria is also a member. Then, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) in 1986 by the Nigerian government was designed under the guidance of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to stimulate domestic production, correct the balance of payment deficit, 
relieve debt burden, control inflation, and attract foreign investors. By 1993, after seven years of 
the SAP implementation, high inflation and interest rate persisted with the high price of consumer 
goods such as cloth. The eliminated all trade barriers and embracing an open market policy further 
increase competition from abroad, especially from Asia, because the SAP crises coincided with 
the boom in China’s textile industry in the 1990s, which necessitated the search for foreign 
markets. (Eneji et al., 2012; John, 1992: 7; Mohammadu et al., 2020:102-103; Obansa, 2005). 
Renne (2016) noted an increase in cooperation between the “Chinese-Nigerian textile trade” in the 
1990s, with Chinese firms opening offices in Lagos and Kano, and the Nigerian personnel does 
the same in Guangzhou, China. The challenges with the SAP may not just be the IMF policy or 
the program; the prevailing political situation and leadership responsible for formulating the trade 
policy in Nigeria might as well contributed to it.      
The textile industry in northern Nigeria was historically anchored in Kaduna and Kano 
mills, but much has changed over the past half-century. By 2014, Chinese textiles accounted for 
90 percent of textiles sold in the Kaduna and Kano market (Maiwada and Renne, 2013:185; 
Murtala M. et al., 2019:5; Sola and Olukoya, 2008). Maiwada and Renne (2013:188) found that 
the Chinese personnel is "acting as suppliers, distributors, and retailers" of Chinese retail goods in 
Kano and Kaduna markets. In 2015, close to US$3.5 billion worth of textiles was reportedly 
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smuggled illegally into the Kano market, mainly from China through Cotonou, Benin to Niger 
Republic (Murtala et al., 2019: 6).  
The influx of Chinese companies and their textiles marks a shift in what led to establishing 
the first mill in Kaduna in 1957, to reduce the country depending on foreign textiles. The influx 
affects both domestic production and consumption of quality textiles. While some Nigerians may 
enjoy buying cheap textiles imported from China, the impacts on jobs lost from the moribund 
factories have been less explored.  
To have Chinese firms dominating the textile industry in northern Nigeria may not 
necessarily the wish of political leaders considering the poverty level ravaging the region. The 
World Bank’s (2016) poverty index report of Nigeria shows that the north accounted for 87 percent 
of Nigeria’s poverty level compared to the south with 12 percent for the same year. Although no 
available statistical data for this study to measures the direct impact of Nigerian policy on lifting 
the ban of textile importation to the poverty level in northern Nigeria, the Nigerian government 
understands the gravity of foreign textiles' impact on local factories. In 2019, the government 
introduced a policy restricting foreign exchange to importers of textile and textile materials in 
Nigeria. Nigeria’s apex bank gave a directive to banks, bureau de change, and operators at the 
foreign exchange markets to stop selling foreign exchange to importers of foreign textiles. To 
discourage importers from keeping importing cheap textiles from foreign countries, especially 
China. (Financial Nigeria, 2019). This shows the seriousness and concern among authority and 
attempts to address one of the textile industry’s challenges. It is also an indication that the textile 
industry in northern Nigeria needs urgent attention.   
Revitalization of the textile industry, focusing on northern Nigeria could help in addressing 
the economic hardship in the region and with a good economic development planning that 
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prioritize the protection of local business could create an opportunity for the northern youth and 
revive the cotton production in the region, especially the north-east where 80 percent of the 
population according to World Bank (2015) rely on farming. Therefore, the textile industry's 
potential may relieve suffering of the people in northern Nigeria. Given the many analyses which 
have linked economic insecurity with Boko Haram’s leverage, revitalizing the textile sector in 
northern Nigeria could also be part of a security-minded economic strategy.    
1.3 Research Purpose and Questions 
This study examines how China’s economic expansion in Africa affects the textile industry in 
northern Nigeria. The research question focuses on the following underlying issues. 
 The overview of significant of China-Africa relations and the challenges   
o China’s level of influence in Africa, and challenges facing the relations    
o The importance of Chinese economic projects in the continent  
 History and economic importance of the textile industry in Nigeria.  
o The size and character of the textile, and to what extent have the changes within 
the textile industry shaped the industrial opportunities of Nigerians?  
o The role of the textile industry in the economic reform of northern Nigeria  
 How Chinese textiles impacted the local supply of Nigeria made products, specifically 
within the northern market. 
o The dominance of China cheap products, smuggling due to porous border, 
government policy and condition of local industry   
 The effects of China-Nigeria relations in northern Nigeria since the establishment of 
FOCAC in 2000 until now. Then projections for the future, long-term.  
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1.4 Significance of the Study  
This thesis’s significance is to fill the gap addresses in the research problem by measuring 
the effects of China’s policy engagement in Africa in various sectors of the economy in countries 
where China has a strong presence. It is another way to evaluate China-Africa relations beyond 
the discussion of concessional loans, economic assistance, and investment in infrastructures. The 
reality of the relationships should focus on China’s national interests and connection to its 
activities in Africa. Understanding this connection will help African leaders in their policy 
formulation and addressing people concerns Beijing’s intention.   
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides a general foundation for 
the work. Define the problem that informed the project, research questions, and significance of the 
study. The second chapter discusses the literature review and theoretical framework. While 
Chapter three focuses on the research methodology, which looks at how data were collected and 
analyzed. Chapter four explains the research findings and answer the questions raised by the 
project. Chapter five is the concluding part with emphasis on summarizes the findings, its 
connection to the research questions, recommendations, and conclusion. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that informs this project. The concept of 
neocolonialism and the soft power approach is the main themes under the theoretical framework. 
The analysis of these two concepts will set a direction for the project. The study will build and 
establish a connection between the two theories and the fundamental questions to be addressed. 
Analyses under these themes are within the context of the political economy of international 
relations. Also, the research will look into other relevant concepts that support the China-Africa 
economic partnership. This chapter will explore these competing visions for African-Chinese 
relationships, whether the relations' character is a new scramble for resources and control or 
genuine partnership. 
2.2 Concept of Colonialism and Neocolonialism 
The rationale behind the focus on China-Africa relations is understanding and assessing 
factors driving the relationship, whether anchored by a mutual benefit to promote sustainable 
development or exploitative where one country takes advantage of another. To examine this is 
necessary considering Africa’s history and the colonialists’ power play in the continent. Walter 
Rodney’s book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, points out that the current 
“underdeveloped” countries in the world faced exploitation in the past, linked the 
underdevelopment of many regions across the world to a “product of capitalist, imperialist and 
colonialist exploitation.” He argues that exploitation leads to exportation, which deprived many 
“societies” the opportunity to enjoy their natural resources. (Rodney, 1973, p. 24-25). In essence, 
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the relationship between two parties is assessed mostly by comparing the benefit accrued to each 
party.     
Rodney contextualized the subject of development and underdevelopment to compare and 
contrast the relationship between Africans and developed nations during the colonial era. Most 
agricultural produce and natural resources from Africa traded in exchange for manufactured 
products with Western powers. The term of trade, that is, the price of produce from Africa and the 
freight rate for shipment are at the discretion of the colonial powers, making Africans an unequal 
partner. The relationship was considered an exploitative system that heavily favors the colonialists. 
It was a slave to a master relationship where the slaves work for peanut at the master’s pleasure. 
Africans did not just capitulate; the exploitation system was made possible, mainly due to the 
West’s superior military power. (Rodney, 1973 :34,37&38). While evaluating Belgium-Congo 
relations in her book, Empire of Capital, Ellen Meiksins (2005:2) considers the system between 
the two countries as a transfer of wealth from Congo to Belgium, without the consent of the 
Congolese. Goncharov (1963:467) sum up the colonial system as “social relation based on the 
political and economic domination of backward people by imperialist powers,” which went on for 
many years before the colonist’s independence, especially after the Second World War. 
Aside from the fact that Africans became subject to the imperial masters, the relationships 
encouraged Western entrepreneurs’ movement to Africa to exploit its riches. Rodney (1973, p. 38) 
refer to this as the “most direct way of sucking the continent.” Africa resources are exploited and 
transferred to the benefit of Europe, North America, and Japan. Foreign ownership of fertile 
agricultural lands, mines, and service provider companies also participated in the exploitation 
system. For instance, Gum from Africa help in the revitalization of the Textile industry in Europe. 
The ivory from Africa was a raw material source for industries in Europe and North America, 
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especially Mincing Lane in London (Rodney, 1973: 131). The more reason Rodney downplay the 
notion that Africans somehow benefited from colonialism in the area of infrastructural provision 
such as railroad, school, hospital, etc. These developments could be considered infinitesimal 
compared to the outward movement of materials from the continent. Describing colonialism as a 
“one-armed bandit” by (Rodney, 1973: 321) could be a fair assessment considering how the 
European decided the future of Africa in Berlin without their participation. What could be more 
critical to the colonialist than to have some facilities to ease the colonies’ administrative running?  
There are debates among scholars about the effects of colonialism in Africa. Some believe 
it is not all that negative; for instance, prominent pioneers of Africa history in Britain, Roland 
Oliver and J. D. Fage, view the adventure of the colonialists in Africa as benevolent with desires 
to help the African societies maintain stability and sustainable growth (Sharkey, 2013: 1). 
Frankema and Waijenburg (2013: 5-6) argue that colonists in West Africa experienced a consistent 
rise in income level among unskilled laborers compare to colonists in East Africa and East Asia. 
In Gold Coast, Southern Nigeria, Gambia, and Sierra Leon, the authors revealed that real wages 
level between the 1880-1940 trend positively (Frankema and Waijenburg, 2013: 9-11). This 
assertion alluded to the idea that colonial masters adopted different policies that yielded different 
results. Therefore, they all could not be lumped together as a negative influence in Africa. Ocheni 
and Nwankwo (2012:51) opines against the impression that the Western education and civilization 
open African communities to modernity on the ground that colonial education is not rooted in 
“African culture” and is not “technology base,” which never lead to the industrial revolution in 
Africa. They argue that education only aided semi-skilled workers such as clerks, interpreters, and 
artisan, useful only to colonial administration. Adu Boahen, Ghanaian historian, cited in Sharkey 
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(2013:1), submit that colonialism’s sole aim is systemic and “ruthless exploitation” of African 
resources to benefit colonialists.  
Likewise, what was considered a transfer of development from the developed nations in 
foreign direct investments during the colonial era came mostly as loans and repayment plans. In 
the 1960s, when most of these underdeveloped countries were just out of the shackle of 
colonialism, the interest rate on most of the loans has grown significantly from $400 million to 
$700 million (Rodney, 1973, p. 39). Apparent, this was an issue for new and young independent 
nations to be still indebted to their formal colonial masters. For instance, Goncharov (1963:471) 
argues that France’s loans for infrastructural development in Cameroon through the “Fund for Aid 
and Corporation” are mainly to ease its daily operation. For clarity purposes, it is only the Western 
capitalist deals with Africa. Some socialist countries, such as Russia and China, are parts of foreign 
nations in contact with the continent (Rodney, 1973:39).  
The adventure of the colonialists did not end with the independence of Africa states. 
Goncharov (1963:467-468), as colonialists losing their grip on Africa due to the rise of nationalism 
and independence, new measures were developed to keep their influence and control. The strategy 
and tactics adopted include the principle of “friendship, co-operation, and free association” with 
African states, otherwise known as the neocolonialism system. An indication that the imperial 
powers hold sophisticated instruments to control most African countries’ political future through 
indirect means. Looking at the idea of neocolonialism, its instruments, and uses, particularly by 
wold powers, will provide insight into China’s national interest in Africa.  
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2.2.1 Concept of Neocolonialism 
The concept of neocolonialism is a post-colonial period approach, designed and mostly 
applied to the countries that got their independence from European powers after World War II. 
Nkrumah (1965, p. ix), a top proponent of this concept, describes in detail the concept 
neocolonialism system in his book, Africa Must Unite, he revealed that it is power without 
responsibility. An orchestrated plan by former colonialists to continue holding significant 
influence and shape the developing countries’ affairs. Adding that the system ensures decisions by 
the third world leaders on economic and political policies revolve around outside influence.  
Neocolonialism has elements of flexibility. Its implementation is not entirely forceful, like 
colonialism, but it is more of an agreement between two parties, with one party having a better 
deal. Upon most African countries’ independence, the former colonialists welcome the new 
nations into different existing world financial institutions. Many bilateral agreements were signed 
with the new world in the area of economic and defense cooperation. In France’s case, a defense 
agreement was reached with the Republic of the Congo and Chad for the French armed forces to 
maintain their presence in both countries but operate under the French government’s authority. 
(Goncharov, 1963:470). 
The entanglement continues with the introduction of more flexible approaches that seems 
beneficial to African countries. Such strategies include loan package and promises of 
developmental assistance. Through loans provided by International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the French government, after independence, Gabon’s manganese mines remain 
under French corporations’ control. (Goncharov, 1963:470). In 1962, the United States and French 
Senegalese company entered a partnership that allows the Americans to increase their phosphates 
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outputs in Senegal from “600,000 to 900,000 tons per year and future target of 1,500,000 tons,” 
the joint venture was funded by the United States (Goncharov, 1963:472). The establishment of 
the Commonwealth of Nations (former British colonists) by Britain enabled them to maintain their 
previous empire (Goncharov, 1963:472). These are plots set by colonialists and capitalists to 
perpetuate themselves into Africans’ economic and political affairs. We can get perceptions from 
these measures into China’s development assistance to Africa.  
As indicated above, the concept of neocolonialism involves flexibility approaches in its 
implementation. There were many instances when capitalists and imperialists deployed their 
military power to meddle in developing countries’ internal politics. Nkrumah supported this logic 
by focusing on some mechanisms in the hands of colonizers and hegemonies. For instance, 
Nkrumah documented how the United States extended its economic, military, and political power 
across continents after attaining the status of a leading global power at the end of World War II. 
He cited the activities of the Pentagon and various established intelligence services such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security 
Agency (NSA), and other intelligence agencies created to promote Washington’s order. These 
intelligence groups are called the “invisible government” who serves the United States foreign 
interest by keeping a close tab on political situation abroad, even intrude when necessary 
(Nkrumah, 1965, p. 240). 
A good example is the CIA’s activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo a few months 
after its independence in 1960. Belin David (1975:5), the summary of facts about CIA involvement 
in the assassination of foreign leaders, revealed that evidence indicated before Lumumba’s death 
in 1961, there was a high discussion among some CIA personnel of “the possibility of undertaking 
a plan to assassinate Lumumba.” Of course, the CIA would not ruminate on such a plan without 
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Washington authorization. Apart from Congo, other cases were the shipment of arms from the 
United States to certain “persons” in the Dominic Republic for the assassination of Generalissimo 
Trujillo (Belin, 1975:3). These are actions that demonstrate the concept of neocolonialism alluded 
to as how the great powers tend to control political affairs using military strength in developing 
countries.  
Other mechanisms described by Nkrumah involve using the world’s financial institutions 
such as the World Bank, International Monetary Funds, and International Finance Corporation to 
check on most developing countries’ economic affairs in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These 
organizations are the creation of western powers to coordinate the international economic system. 
Nkrumah asserts that these institutions’ loans come with a high-interest rate that makes repayment 
more challenging to fulfill for most developing countries, resulting in loan servicing without 
paying the actual loan. The “multilateral aid” assistance from these establishments mentioned 
above also comes with Nkrumah’s specific conditions, referred to as “offensive condition.” Some 
of the conditions require the borrowers (developing nations) to reveal economic plan and policy 
to these financial bodies for review before aid can be granted and make the borrowers accept inputs 
and supervision of the Bretton Woods institutions on how to expend the loan and aid (Nkrumah, 
1965, p. 242-243).  
In retrospect, the inputs and supervision of the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s, when 
most developing nations who borrowed money from the organizations failed in their repayment 
plan, resulted into financial and political instability for these countries, which led to the 
introduction of another reform plan called the Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP). The plan also 
involves dictating certain conditions before new loans can be obtained or get a low-interest rate on 
the existing one. Some of these conditions include free market, privatization and deregulation, and 
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reduction in trade barriers. (Lensink, 1996). These open the struggling home industries to 
competition from advance foreign firms. Aside from the fact that the SAP programs further 
plunged many countries in Africa and Latin America into a deeper economic downturn, it also 
failed to alleviate poverty and financial situation. One could argue that developing countries 
pressured to buy into the plan because they are already in massive debt to the few Western 
countries that control the international financial system; not accepting would mean more economic 
sanctions. This shows an attempt by the capitalists to continue perpetuating themselves into 
developing countries’ economic affairs. These forms of interference are all embedded in the 
neocolonialism concept. Just like colonialism, understanding the concept of the neocolonialism 
system is essential to this project. The idea is not to create a negative image of Western countries 
or castigate them for most developing nations’ challenges. The target is to evaluate the trajectory 
of African politics with world powers. To established that as far as global politics is concerned, 
national interest matters. That is what drives countries to form alliances or relations.  
This study’s focus is China-Africa relations; in a matter of relevance, China is a global 
power with significant influence. The country’s footprints are vivid across African countries. 
China, unlike most Western powers, has no history of colonialism in Africa. The existing narrative 
suggests China, like African countries, share a similar experience as a victim of imperialists, 
alluded to the annexation of some Chinese provinces by the Japanese armed forces in 1931 (Hotta, 
2007:75). It created an impression that China’s adventure in Africa is an extension of brotherly 
love. There could be some truth elements in this argument, but the neocolonialism system is not 
peculiar to Western powers or former colonialists. The United States, unlike Britain, France, and 
Portugal, control little to no territory in Africa during colonialization but exert its power and 
influence in the continent due to its status as a world power. For most countries, national interest 
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dictates their foreign policy. Achieving it could warrant applying instruments of neocolonialism, 
hard or soft approaches. The next section focuses on China’s flexible approach in Africa from 
neocolonialism perspectives. 
2.3 Understanding China in Africa  
Some observers view China’s interest in Africans is not to colonize the continent but to 
pursue mutual trade relations and developmental assistance through economic support in the 
service and manufacturing sectors (Wenjie et al., 2015:16; Chien-Kai, 2016:101). Sun (2014) 
affirmed in his assessment that the victimization experience consolidated China-Africa relations 
since 1949. He argues that people misconstrued China’s intention as exploitative. While Yan 
Xuetong (2006: 7) submit that the rise to political and economic prominence compels China to 
take more “responsibilities for the world economy and security” by sharing their positive domestic 
economic reform with developing countries.  
Talking about domestic policy and reform, China is one of the few nations that did not 
collapse during the wave of globalization, like most developing countries in Africa and South 
America. China was very thoughtful in adopting and implementing a trading policy introduced by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). China carefully processes Washington's proposed global 
economic system, which called for an open market and trade liberalization (Stiglitz, 2002: 126). 
Beijing stalled in a protracted trade negotiation with the United States to hold-off the 
implementation of liberalization policies (Stiglitz, 2002:63-64). This action allows the Chinese 
government to reach its consensus on implementing the neoliberal economic agenda. China 
dropped “protective barriers” to its domestic market gradually, phasing them out only for every 
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new job created in the process (Stiglitz, 2002: 60). This reform helped China emerge as an 
alternative to the Western imperialists and project China Consensus as a new reality.   
Although China may appear a new deal to Africans, its policy still lacks a comprehensive 
long-term strategic vision (Sun, 2014). Even with the absence of adequate knowledge of China’s 
foreign policy in Africa, it is certainly not complicated like the power-play between Belgium and 
Congo, the France-Algeria war, which lasted for eight years from1954-1962 or the involvement 
of America in the Somalia civil war in the 1990s. It is also not complicated to suggest how China 
portrays its relations with Africa. Beijing Africa Policy defines China as a friend and is interested 
in promoting a win-win situation through its foreign aid and investment in Africa. The Chinese 
government emphasized this in the first and second white papers reissued in 2006 and 2011 
(Brookings, 2014). It is suggesting that China is taking soft and persuasive diplomacy to enhance 
its relationship with Africa. Perhaps, the element of this approach explains why African countries 
warmly embrace China’s gesture.  The next section focuses on the soft power policy and how it is 
shaping China-Africa relations.    
2.3.1 Concept of Soft Power Diplomacy  
The concept was developed in 1990 by Joseph Nye. According to him, it is the power to 
create an attractive agenda that others can embrace and appeal and influence others' preferences in 
the world’s politics (Nye, 2004:5). What is clear from Nye’s delineation is that the underlying 
assumptions of soft power are “appeal and attraction,” which represent factors that distinguish it 
from hard power. Threats and intimidation are characteristics of hard power. If applied, they can 
lead to influence and control. Without elements of force, colonialism may not succeed in Africa 
or Latin America. The United States war on terrorism in Iraq's in 2003, over the alleged weapons 
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of mass destruction (WMD). Also, sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program demonstrates the use 
of both military and economic measures to compel compliance. Soft power is an attractive power, 
oppose to the use of coercion, and its resources are the “assets that produce such attraction” (Nye, 
2004: 6). 
The soft power assets are categories into resources and behavior. The behavior comprises 
agenda-setting, attraction, and co-option, while its resources include culture, value, and foreign 
policies. It combines the two assets, particularly the resources that produce soft power, that guides 
the national interest in global politics.  (King, 2013 and Nye, 2004:8). 
Table 2-1: Soft Power Asset 
Behavior Resources 
Agenda-Setting Value 
Attraction Culture 
Co-option Policies 
 
The culture, values, and foreign policy create perceptions about a country among nations' 
comity. Norway, for instance, is known for its peace initiative efforts to help countries in conflict. 
Popular among various ideas is the Oslo peace accord between Israel and Palestine in 1993, led by 
Terje Roed-Larsen. Norway’s foreign policy encourages cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations to promote peace across the globe. In the academic realm, Norwegians have 
contributed significantly to peace research. Norwegian Johan Galtung proposed the theory of 
positive and negative peace for conflict analysis in the 1960s and studied in universities worldwide. 
These activities create an image for Norway as a peacemaker (Nye, 2004:10).  
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The domestic and foreign policies promoted by a government could serve as a source of its 
soft power or any power; in essence, creating awareness for policies is an avenue to increase 
attraction. Nye (2004:13) identifies three primary sources countries use to promote soft power: 
“public diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.” Public diplomacy can enhance the 
positive image through information sharing on traditional media and various social media outlets. 
Likewise, a state could invoke media propaganda to promote a political agenda or cause of action. 
The Encyclopedia Britannica (2017) considers public diplomacy an attempt by a country to use 
“international media to portray its official policies favorably to targeted foreign audiences.” During 
the Cold War, the events that took place show how the United States and the Soviet Union used 
public diplomacy as both powers engage in the ideological supremacy of capitalism and socialism 
around the world. The U.S. built a “reading room” and uses “Voice of America” to eastern 
European countries. Similarly, the U.S. rally its allies to support or oppose a particular position 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2017). 
Further, soft power may not be an instrument of state actors. Non-state actors such as 
transnational corporations, religious organizations, and intergovernmental organizations like 
World Trade Organizations and United Nations through advocacy and public relations activities 
can also bring attention to specific issues (Nye, 2004: 90-92). This understanding is critical 
because it helps explain how China strategically deploys its soft power to guide its relations with 
Africa. 
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2.3.2 China’s Soft Power Approach in Africa 
The introduction of the soft power principle in China's foreign policy dated back to 1993, 
but its actual implementation began in 2007 when the country starts to play a more significant role 
in global politics. China's motive to adopt soft power instruments to guide its foreign policy goes 
deep into attempting to rival the United States influence across the world and create an alternative 
to Washington-led global leadership. China designed this diplomacy approach on the premises of 
Marxist values and the concept of Confucianism. China acts as a revolutionary leader in the 
emerging economy and developing countries challenging the United States' dominance with a 
Confucian attitude of friendliness and mutual concern. (Sayama, 2016:1&5). China demonstrated 
this during the global financial crisis in 2008, injected an economic stimulus plan of ¥4 trillion to 
support its market. The World Bank applauds China's move and recommends such expenditures 
in Western countries (Naughton, 2008: 2). 
To further contextualize how China’s soft power policy influences its foreign relations. 
Mikail and David (2018) pointed out that power is an integral part of the Chinese government 
strategy, playing a crucial role in economic diplomacy with the global South and, to a large extend, 
guiding the diplomatic relations with Southern Asian countries to gain leverage over the South 
China Sea. The approach, which often focuses on influencing the foreign people and their leaders, 
also allows China to “keep a low profile while accumulating power” and create an impression that 
portrays the country as a peaceful nation constituting no threat to any states (Sayama, 2016:7). Part 
of this approach includes using the Chinese diaspora entrepreneurs to lobby foreign government 
to sway decisions that support Beijing’s agenda of dominant power and ensuring a favorable 
condition for Chinese businesses abroad (Sayama, 2016:12). 
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In Africa, China’s approach is linked with the pursuit of trade and investment and using 
financial resources such as business funds, loans, grants, and relief package to build a relationship 
with countries. Primarily, Beijing’s foreign policy with Africa revolves around “payment,” which 
is mostly concessional and often portrayed as China’s generosity. (Liang, 2012:669). Jennifer 
(2007: 27), in her study, posits that China’s policy in Africa is rooted in economic engagement. 
While Lyman, cited in Pan (2006), summarizes China’s soft policy in Africa as involving 
professing solidarity with African countries at an international forum and making a substantial 
investment in infrastructure, agriculture, and energy. Sall (2016: 134-137) argues that this event is 
a departure from what seems to be an overbearing relationship existing between the Western 
powers and African leaders full of constant lecturing on governance, human rights, and the rule of 
law. 
Undoubtedly, Africa is a continent rich in natural resources attracting many great powers 
for exploration and exploitation, and due to its large population, it is also an attractive market base 
for manufactured goods in industrial countries. China understands these potentials in Africa and 
soft power through payments, and generosity is a smart way to attract and penetrate the continent 
to access the resources and markets. Liang (2012:673) emphasized that China has always regarded 
Africa as a destination for its manufacturing products, as stated in China’s paper policy in 2006. 
Liang further opined that the three biggest economies in Africa in terms of gross domestic product 
(GDP), South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt, receive much focus from Chinese businesses. The three 
countries account for thirty-nine percent of China’s total exports to Africa. Another fact is that 
China also needs continuous resources from Africa to maintain its growing economy. From the 
African perspective, China’s industrial needs create a market for Africa’s raw materials 
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representing a new revenue source outside the traditional partners in America, Europe, and Japan. 
It is an understanding that seems to offer some mutual gain for both parties. 
To many African leaders, unconditional aid from China removes the bottleneck in getting 
funds to facilitate projects and reduce over-reliance on the Western countries as the primary source 
of capital inflow. China’s policy of nonintervention, strengthen by Confucius’s belief of loyalty 
and respect for authority, depicts China as a non-aggressive power that has no interest in the 
domestic politics of the host country. (Sall, 2016: 135). Many rogue leaders in Africa welcome 
this assurance of political neutrality. To them, China is a new reality, not overly concerned by the 
country’s corrupt index or human rights records to sign trade agreements or to attach strict 
conditions before issuing loans. This idea tends to suggest to us that even if a country is corrupt 
and lacks good leadership, it should not deprive its people of receiving vital international aid: 
China mainly secures loyalty and support for its global agenda through this approach. For instance, 
through the FOCAC, China has established diplomatic relations with fifty-three African countries, 
many of whom have a history of corruption and human rights violations. At the United Nations 
general assembly, most of the fifty-three countries would probably align and vote with Beijing on 
issues that concern its national interest. The next section will focus on this aspect under the 
FOCAC plan. 
This review shows that China understands the essence of using soft power in Africa to 
obtain more favorable conditions to support its national priority interests. Nye (2004), soft power 
diplomacy allows countries to set policies to achieve national interest at home and abroad. China 
has strategically combined “constructive journalism and media strategy” to enhance its image and 
activities in Africa (Sall, 2016:138). The launching of the China Global Television Network 
(CGTN) in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2012 is part of broader efforts designed to create and promote new 
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narratives about Africa-China cooperation in the area of culture, trade, and investment. Nothing 
could be more important to the Chinese government than to see the international audience having 
positive perspectives on China's commitment to Africa's development. The CGTN is a propaganda 
machine meant to eulogize China's greatness and benevolence toward Africans and the rest of the 
world. And continue to project Africa as a prosperous continent compared with the most frustrating 
and pessimistic news in the Western media. Understanding the concept of soft power and how it 
works, in this case, with China, is vital in analyzing the policies and programs such as the road and 
belt initiative and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 
2.4 The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)  
An effort to develop more flexible mechanisms to enhance the China-Africa relations led 
to the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2000. The forum promotes 
cooperation between China and African countries. The organization's formation rests on the 
existing relationship tracing back to the 1950s when China supported African states' 
decolonization. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the link between 
Beijing and Africa became very strong. Major events before the first summit are listed below: 
The Major Timeline  
The 1960s-1970s  
During this time, China-Africa relations centered on the “eight principles of foreign 
economic and technology.” drafted in 1964 during the official visit of China’s premier Enlai to 
Ghana. The draft specifies developmental and financial aid to other countries and concessional 
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loans with free or low interest. To seek equality and justice for developing nations and respect 
territorial integrity. (Li Anshan et al., 2012: 11). 
The 1970s-1980s  
Steps toward FOCAC started when thirty-three African leaders visited China in the 1970s 
and fifty-one in the 1980s. A lot comes with this visit, supports China's bid to re-enter the United 
Nations (U.N.) and the growing economic and diplomatic relations. Twenty-six African countries 
supported China to regain its status at the U.N. in 1971. Mao Zedong recognizes this, said the 
support from Africa guaranteed their re-entry into the U.N. The Chinese government responded to 
Zambia’s needs in 1970 when they decided to take up the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia 
railway project abandoned by the West because of cost and logistics involves. This event was 
significant because it opens up the Zambia economy to Dar es Salaam and reduced reliance on 
Zimbabwe and South Africa. It was a huge diplomatic victory for China, who are battling their 
internal challenges over the Western countries who refuse to fund the project. This move also 
attracted more countries from Africa to China. (Liang, 2012 and Li Anshan et al., 2012: 11). Many 
Scholars regarded the mid-1980s when Africa changed its policy toward China as an alternative 
to the West since 1949. Between 1982 to 1985, twenty-nine African leaders visited Beijing. In 
1986, Chairman Li Xiannian visited three African countries. Premier Zhao Ziyang, in 1983 during 
his visit to Africa, announced the four principles that would guide the China-Africa economic 
relations: sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity, and joint development. At a time when 
Africa is facing challenges, businesses folding up, huge debts owed to Western financial 
institutions, and the failed structural adjustment program. The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 
was another moment China received massive support from African countries when the West 
imposed an embargo due to forcible response to protesters at the square. Several African leaders 
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visited China during this time to show support and help China survive the Ban. (Li Anshan et al., 
2011:8; Li Anshan et al., 2012: 11-12). 
The 1990s-2000s  
African leaders continue their support for China as they join leaders of other developing countries 
in 1997 to reject Western countries' attempts to impose an anti-China resolution on human rights 
(Li Anshan et al., 2012:13). In 1997, African heads of states proposed “one to multi partnership” 
with China to mirror the United States-Africa Business Forum, British Commonwealth 
Conference, Franco-Africa Summit, and Tokyo International Conference. China came to similar 
conclusions to design a long-term strategic plan with Africa after its leaders, Jiang Zemin, received 
a report on China’s future direction with Africa from selected Chinese scholars led by Zhao 
Changhui of Export and Import Bank. The report suggested establishing of an “inter-ministerial 
committee comprises of both Africa and China representatives to implement the proposed forum. 
Beijing holds the first summit in 2000 between 10-12 October. (Li Anshan et al., 2011:10-11). 
Currently, fifty-three African countries are a member of FOCAC except for Eswatini (formerly 
Swaziland), who sided with Taiwan. The action plans revolved around four major areas: political, 
economic, international affairs, and social development. See the table below: 
  Table 2-2: FOCAC Four Action Plan Areas  
Political Economic International Affair Social Development 
High-level visit and 
dialogue 
Agriculture Peaceful coexistence, 
principle of 
constitutive act  
Development 
assistance to Africa 
Follow-up action design 
to aid the cooperation 
Investment and business 
cooperation 
Support Africa 
countries seeking 
WTO membership 
multilateral trade 
regime 
China-Africa inter-
governmental human 
resources 
development  
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Create a contact between 
legislatures and local 
government 
China-Africa joint 
trade’s chamber of 
commerce 
Promote MDGs in 
China and Africa 
Culture and 
Education: strength 
exchange between the 
Chinese and 
Africans. 
Civilizations and 
enhance bilateral 
cultural interaction.  
Consular and judicial 
cooperation 
Finance cooperation 
between Chinese 
financial institutions and 
African financial 
institutions 
Counter-terrorism 
cooperation 
Education: exchange 
program between 
institution and 
educational dialogue 
Cooperation between 
China-African Union as 
well as sub-regional 
organizations in Africa 
Infrastructures, 
transportation and 
telecommunication 
Challenges of non-
traditional security 
issues 
Medical care and 
public health 
 Cooperation in energy 
and resources: Joint 
exploration and rational 
exploitation of energy 
Global push for 
attention on regional 
conflict in Africa 
Environmental 
protection  
 Cooperation on science 
and technology: Provide 
training courses in 
technologies to Africans  
 Tourism and news 
media 
  Source: focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t280369.htm  
2.4.1 Investment and Trade Cooperation under FOCAC  
The Chinese financial institutions were a part of the mechanisms to promote China’s 
interest in Africa. For instance, the People’s Bank of China is responsible for small and medium 
businesses in Africa. The Export-Import Bank of China Bank is a government bank responsible 
for international cooperation, especially supporting foreign construction projects and investment 
abroad through mixed and buyer credit programs and preferential loans. Bank of China is a 
commercial and state-owned helping entrepreneurs from China in Africa. The bank also assists 
African banks in promoting development. The bank has branches in Zambia and South Africa. (Li 
Anshan et al., 2012:28) 
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To generate rapid industrialization, the Chinese built free trade zones across Africa. These 
zones include; the Suez Economic Zone in Egypt, Lekki Free Trade Zone in Nigeria, Ogun- 
Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Nigeria, the Eastern Industrial Zone in Ethiopia, the Zambia-China 
Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the Sunshine International Industrial Park in Chad, the 
Sino-Uganda Mbale Industrial Park, and the Ethiopia-China Light Industry City (Zeng and Shu, 
2018:98). Li Anshan et al. (2012:34), China extends its outreach beyond the African leaders; they 
cooperate with sub-regional institutions by organizing seminars in Anglophone, Francophone, and 
Lusophone countries Africa to promote contemporary China. This forum allows China to prioritize 
Africa, using the FOCAC summit to reiterate support for African development and becoming the 
largest trading partner. Although the financial assistance from Beijing to Africa did not start with 
FOCAC, between 1956-1977, African leaders received $2.5 billion in aid from the Chinese 
government. The fund fell from $100.9 million to $13.8 million between 1976 and 1982 (Liang, 
2012:670). 
              Table 2-3: FOCAC Financial Aid to Africa 2006-2018 
Year Concessional Loan (US dollar) 
2006 $5 billion 
2009 $10 billion 
2012 $20 billion 
2015 $35 billion 
2018 $60 billion 
                  Source: Zeng and Shu (2018:97) 
After the first FOCAC summit, China’s aid spread across almost all regions in Africa. The 
transportation and energy sectors account for sixty-six percent of Chinese investment in Africa. 
(Brookings Institute, 2018). Figure ii shows industries with the highest of China’s capital 
investment in Africa.    
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                                   Figure 2-1: Chinese Investment in Africa 
      
                   
                                             Source: Brookings Institute (2018) 
2.4.2 Understanding China-Africa Affairs through Development Cooperation   
In China-Africa affairs, such as the FOCAC forum, some of the challenges faced are the 
lack of collective dialogue in which policies are formulation by the Chinese political bureau, 
leaving African leaders with a limited choice in the decision-making process. African professionals 
from the academic and economic fields did not have equal participation in guiding African leaders 
before making a deal to prevent exploitation. (Li Anshan, 2012). It negates the FOCAC as an 
example of equality and mutual benefit in South-South cooperation. 
The weak national and regional development plan has not made Africa an equal participant 
in the forum. China funds most development projects because Africa lacks the financial power to 
sustain its partner in the forum. Weak coordination among government agencies, political 
instability, corruption, and administrative inefficiency is far too common in African politics to 
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allow for national policies that drive development or support economic plans. (Zeng and Shu, 
2018). Larry and Lyle (2014) argue that China may be taking advantage of African governments’ 
weaknesses and corruption to negotiate an unfair deal.  
These are real concerns that deserve proper attention. However, African leaders have 
continuing to show support for the Beijing agenda. The fact that China’s idea of government to 
government contracts with few, if any, string attached was a welcoming and positive development 
in Africa (Larry and Lyle, 2014). President Xi shared this sentiment in 2018 at the seventh FOCAC 
summit that China intends to help Africa with financial assistance is genuine with “no strings 
attached” to dispel the “debt trap” concern. The support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative is 
increasing, with many African leaders committing to the initiative. (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), 2018). David (2016) admits that Chinese financing is enough to help 
develop growth in Africa. China has created economic enthusiasm and investment in countries 
with weak governance indicators such as Angola, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
China has the one-sixth of the $30 billion annual external funds for infrastructural purposes in 
Africa. 
What is evident from the analysis provided above is that the need for infrastructure 
facilities such as transportation systems, communication systems, sewerage, and water system, and 
other public goods drives many African leaders towards Beijing. In 1965 when leaders of Western 
countries questioned the sudden cozy relations between Tanzania President, Julius Nyerere, and 
Chairman Mao over the Tanzania-Zambia railway project, the West had refused to fund. Nyerere 
reply to the Western concern by saying, “all the money in this world is either red or blue. I do not 
have my own green money, so where can I get some from? I am not taking a cold war position. 
All I want is money to build it” (George, 2014: 65). The former Liberian minister of public works, 
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Gyuda Moore, made a similar remark that after a protracted civil war, with no good credit record 
and $5 billion in debt, Liberia has no option than to reach out to China who is willing to assist 
(Askary and Ross, 2018:5). China understands this need and the readiness of African leaders to 
take the bid to secure money for infrastructures. In 2019, Ghana used its bauxite rock as an 
“exchange” for a $2 billion loan from China for the infrastructural project (CSIS, 2020). China-
Djibouti partnership in the belt and road initiative has yielded a $14.4 billion loan to finance 
infrastructural facilities for Djibouti, with China also establishing its military base in the country 
(Chaziza, 2018). It is not different in Angola; the concessional loans granted by China’s Export-
Import Bank are mostly in exchange for crude oil (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2016: 5). 
During this COVID-19 pandemic, China continues to reach out to Africa and the rest of the world 
with medical supplies to show support and control the narrative of the crisis that started in Wuhan, 
China. 
The attractiveness and benefit that come with soft power resources may blind the 
beneficiaries to think about the future consequence or reality of any bilateral or multilateral deal. 
Even when you have the sense of the truth that it may lead to subversion, the urgency and 
desperation for assistance take preeminence over any concern. China successfully strengthened its 
grip on Africa because they understand the needs of the continent, which is financial aid for 
infrastructures and investment, at a time when the Western world scale-down their engagement. 
2.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the study focused on the theoretical justification by looking at basic 
principles of colonialism and neocolonialism and how the Western powers use these principles to 
control the economy and political affairs of the African continent. Beyond that, the chapter also 
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examined how a soft power approach, a non-coercive tool adapted by great powers like China to 
shape its engagement with Africa. These concepts have helped to set up bases on how to other 
chapters. The next chapter discusses the research methodology used in data collection. 
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Chapter Three 
Research Methodology and Data  
3.1 Data Collection and Interpretation 
This study is a qualitative research that relied mainly on various secondary sources. The 
secondary data sources include relevant textbooks, research journals, and professional papers on 
China-Africa relations, China-Nigeria. Relevant data from the government publications and 
projects from institutes on the textile industry in Africa, Nigeria, and Northern Nigeria. Also, from 
newspapers and an online library with materials that are critical to the study. The research analyzed 
data collected using descriptive statistical techniques and qualitative methods. This approach helps 
the research source for the appropriate data needed to address the topic and answer the questions 
raised. The qualitative approach provides more useful content in analyzing the policy guiding 
China's foreign relations in Africa, especially regarding Chinese roles and activities in the textile 
industry in Kaduna and Kano city in Nigeria. The information gathered through the qualitative 
research process enables the study to predict future China-Africa relations.  
3.2 Study Area  
The project focuses on Northern Nigeria in explaining China-Africa relations. Narrow, but 
it helps to understand the local people's concerns in various sub-sectors like the textile industry. 
At this level of activities, we can better evaluate China's long-term and strategic interests in Africa. 
Also, to know the impacts of the soft policy and FOCAC in various sectors of Africa's economy.  
The study concentrated on two states, Kano and Kaduna, because the demographic 
statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (2017) ranked Kano as the most populous state in 
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Nigeria, while Kaduna placed third. Kaduna city, the capital of Kaduna state, is the "largest textile-
manufacturing center" in Nigeria (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020). Kano city, the capital of Kano 
State, is the largest commercial center of the northern region with industries such as the textile, 
tanning, footwear, and home of local dye pits for making cloth and leather (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2020b).  
This project focuses on Kano and Kaduna because they are relevant to Nigeria's textile 
industry and hope to understand Chinese activities and its impacts on the textile industry in 
northern Nigeria. This approach could serve as a way of explaining the nexus between China's 
foreign policy and national interest with Africa.     
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Chapter Four 
Research Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers data from different sources, and its analysis is expected to provide 
the basis for interpreting the research findings, which would assist in drawing up a conclusion and 
necessary recommendations in the next chapter. The data collected are analyzed qualitatively and 
used in answering the research questions. This chapter is divided into three parts: China-Africa 
relations, China-Nigeria relations, and its impacts on the textile industry in northern Nigeria. Data 
from the Afrobarometer survey was adopted to provide content into the significance and challenges 
of China-Africa relations. The study also used the Afrobarometer to show China and Nigeria's 
economic cooperation and factors shaping China's positive and negative image in Nigeria and 
Africa. Data from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) was vital in discussing Nigeria's 
textile industry and how it concerns China and the overall trade value between China and Nigeria. 
Figures from the WITS data explain exports and imports of textiles and clothing and footwear 
between China and Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 to 2018. Relevant 
statistical data would have been more useful to precisely analyze factors that linked China to the 
textile industry in northern Nigeria. Instead, the chapter provided narrative explanations to 
strengthen the argument from information obtained from journal articles, Central Bank of Nigeria, 
and official government statements on newspaper on how China relations with Nigeria impacted 
the textile industry in Kano and Kaduna states. Other sources of information that guide the chapter 
include Brookings Institute and China-Africa Research Institute at John Hopkins. 
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4.2 Data Analysis on External Influence in Africa   
The Afrobarometer is an institute with a series of surveys in more than thirty countries in 
Africa on various issues such as democracy, economic, and governance since 1999. This chapter 
adopted the Afrobarometer survey conducted between 2014/2015, which focused explicitly on 
how China-Africa relations have evolved. A face-to-face interview was conducted in thirty-six 
countries in Africa in each country’s official language. The survey interviewed 54,000 respondents 
with margin sampling errors at “+/- 2 percent for a sample of 2,400 or +/-3 for a sample of 1,200.” 
(Afrobarometer, 2016: 2). The survey did not state the number of respondents interviewed in each 
country and how it was determined. 
The socio-demographic variables of the respondents include age, poverty level, education, 
age, and gender. The survey measures respondent's opinions and perceptions on the external 
influence of the United States, China, formal colonial power, India, South-Africa, and international 
organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank in Africa. Other issues addressed by the 
survey relevant to the studies are factors contributing to China’s positive and negative image in 
Africa and the respondent’s opinion on China’s economic assistance to the continent. Table 4-1 
below shows the percentage of influence of China, the United States, and the former colonial in 
Africa, and table 4-2 shows the respondents’ socio-demographic.  
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Table 4-1: External influence in Africa |by China, the U. S. and former Colonial Power |36     
countries 
 African Countries External Influence in Percentage 
Former Colonial Power United States China 
Cote d’ Iviore 89% 5% 3% 
Senegal 58% 14% 12% 
Ghana 9% 33% 27% 
Nigeria 9% 39% 30% 
South-Africa 7% 28% 40% 
Kenya 7% 39% 38% 
Tanzania 5% 31% 40% 
Egypt 5% 20% 47% 
Sudan 4% 20% 47% 
Mozambique 5% 8% 55% 
Zimbabwe 5% 14% 55% 
Zambia 5% 17% 47% 
Mali 73% 8% 13% 
Gabon 80% 3% 5% 
Benin 54% 7% 15% 
Cameroon 68% 8% 15% 
Togo 62% 6% 7% 
Guinea 62% 12% 13% 
Burkina-Faso 61% 13% 10% 
Niger 60% 11% 16% 
Tunisia 47% 35% 2% 
Madagascar 42% 12% 27% 
Morocco 30% 35% 5% 
Algeria 27% 26% 20% 
Cape Verde 25% 31% 27% 
Sierra Leone 24% 23% 22% 
Sao Tome and Principe 17% 12% 24% 
Malawi 13% 32% 12% 
Mauritius 13% 10% 25% 
Botswana 11% 27% 25% 
Namibia 7% 14% 35% 
Uganda 6% 40% 20% 
Burundi 3% 35% 11% 
Swaziland 3% 9% 35% 
Lesotho 2% 9% 30% 
Liberia - 87% 8% 
Average 28% 22% 23% 
    Source: Afrobarometer (2016:9) 
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     Table 4-2: External Influence in Africa | by Sociodemographic variables | 36 countries 
                          
         Source: Afrobarometer (2016: 11) 
The perceptions of the socio-demographic variables show variations in response to external 
influence in Africa. For instance, urban and rural residents consider former colonial power to hold 
more substantial weight than China and the United States. Simultaneously, the educational level 
shows respondents with primary, secondary, and post-secondary education see China more 
influential. The difference between China and the United States is within the range of 3/1 across 
the countries. As early mentioned, this was an opinion-based survey. The survey did not specify 
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factors that dictated the respondent’s choice on the external influence of former colonial power 
and the United States in 36 countries, unlike China, the survey's primary focus. The respondents 
pinpoint factors contributing to China’s external influence and image in Africa, which help address 
the significance of China-Africa relations and challenges.     
From Table 4-1, the survey suggests respondents from the former French colonies like Cote 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, Togo, Tunisia, Tunisia, Benin, Burkina-Faso, among others, likely to 
consider former colonial powers most influential. As revealed in the literature review, 
neocolonialism is an instrument of former colonialists to retain power and influence in their former 
colonies. In this regard, this applies to France, with its former colonies in West Africa still tie-up 
to French Treasury Department and using the CFA franc as legal tender.  It was an arrangement 
made in 1954 and kept in place through the post-colonialism until recently. Efforts to cease using 
the CFA franc and separate from the French Treasury is on the table (Koddenbrock and Ndongo 
Sambia, 2019). By this, France has been able to retain some connection with its former colonies 
in West Africa. It might also be due to economic assistance from Paris. 
In places where the United States takes top spot; Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, 
Malawi, Kenya, and Liberia. One can argue that the impact could be due to how the United States 
often portrays its foreign policy of promoting democracy across the world to achieve economic 
and political stability. The role of international institutions such as IMF, the World Bank, and the 
World Trade Organization, which have been an instrument of Washington to advance the free-
market economic policies in most of these countries, could also have given the United States an 
edge in mentioned countries. These approaches once made the United States the biggest trading 
partner with Africa. For instance, Nigeria transited to the civil rule in 1999 and has always 
welcomed two of the United States' political institutes, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
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and International Republican Institute (IRI), to play a vital role in every election year in Nigeria. 
They work with various civil societies and political parties to foster and promote democratic 
institutions. The two institutes usually organize international groups to monitor Nigeria's election 
process and produce reports that make recommendations on enhancing election credibility in the 
country (NDI, 2019). 
The United States is also in the top six of the most common export destinations for Nigerian 
goods with a US$4 billion trade value representing 6.08 percent export share in 2018 compared to 
China with just 1.67 percent in the same year (WITS, 2018). The USAID has continued to reach 
out to Nigeria. In 2018, the organization released a US$89 million assistance fund to support the 
health infrastructure, education, agriculture, and good governance in Nigeria (USAID, 2018). This 
form of assistance has helped fight Polio and malaria in Nigeria, especially in the country's 
northern region. More recently, despite its challenges confronting the coronavirus pandemic, the 
U.S., according to the Department of States, has donated US$41.3 million to assist Nigeria to curb 
the spread of the disease (Punch, 2020). And Nigeria President, Muhammadu Buhari, is the First 
African Leader to visit Trump at the White House during his presidency in 2018 and one of the 
first two African leaders and South-Africa President that Trump called after taken office (Chicago 
Tribune, 2018). These might explain why respondents view the U.S. to likely hold more influence 
in Nigeria with 39 percent than China with 30 percent, which is still a significant number compares 
to former colonial powers at just nine percent. The next section will focus on China's activities in 
Nigeria.  
In Egypt and South-Africa, respondents considered China likely to have the most external 
influence. Even though Washington has a long history with Egypt, the Congressional Research 
Service report in 2016 stated that between 1948 to 2016, the United States has provided US$77.4 
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billion bilateral foreign aid to Egypt and US$1.3 billion per annual for military assistance since 
1987 till date (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). China has not been slow down by this. The 
reality with South-Africa could not be far-fetched. In 2010, the country joined Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China's economic bloc called the BRICS (South-Africa Government, 2020). This 
alliance could allow for better political and economic coordination between China, a leading 
member of the bloc, and South-Africa. Other places where China holds strong influence are 
Southern Africa countries like Namibia, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, and the Great 
Lakes region like Tanzania. 
The survey shows that many countries admit that China’s economic assistance is good for 
Africa (See Table 4-3). Factors such as investment in infrastructures, affordable manufacturing 
products from China, business investment, support for African countries in the international arena, 
and policy of non-interference in domestic affairs contributed positively to China’s influence in 
Africa. The investment in infrastructures, Chinese entrepreneurs, and affordable products 
accounted for 71 percent of respondents’ complimentary China views in 35 countries surveyed 
(See Table 4-4). It pretty much explains China’s significance in Africa and why they have more 
substantial influence in many countries of Africa. 
                  Table 4-3: Response to China’s Economic Assistance in Africa | 35 countries 
Countries  China Economic Development Assistance rated in % 
Very Good Very Bad Neither Bad 
or God 
Don’t Know 
Mali 88% 9% 2% - 
Cote d’ Ivoire 81% 6% 3% 9% 
Burkina Faso 78% 11% 2% 10% 
Senegal 54% 23% 6% 16% 
Zambia 69% 11% 8% 11% 
Zimbabwe 46% 30% 14% 8% 
South-Africa 40% 24% 18% 16% 
Tanzania 52% 18% 14% 15% 
Sudan 59% 18% 9% 7% 
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Cameroon 73% 14% 6% 6% 
Gabon 76% 21% - - 
Guinea 76% 10% 2% - 
Nigeria 56% 13% 14% 16% 
Ghana 30% 41% 9% 19% 
Kenya 67% 14% 8% 10% 
Egypt 24% 18% 16% 37% 
Algeria 32% 31% 19% 12% 
Morocco 21% 10% 13% 43% 
Tunisia  47% 19% 7% 24% 
Niger 77% 11% 3% 9% 
Togo 71% 12% 2% 15% 
Mauritius 70% 11% 8% 11% 
Liberia 68% 20% 7% 5% 
Botwana 64% 18% 9% 10% 
Cape Verde 63% 13% 12% 12% 
Benin  59% 16% 5% 20% 
Burundi 58% 12% 2% 27% 
Namibia 52% 32% 14% 1% 
Uganda 49% 16% 5% 30% 
Lesotho 44% 32% 9% 14% 
Sierra Leone 44% 12% 10% 34% 
Sao Tome and Principe 44% 5% 6% 45% 
Mozambique 43% 19% 12% 24% 
Malawi 43% 39% 3% 15% 
Madagascar 38% 53% 8% 1% 
Average 56% 19% 8% 16% 
       Source: Afro-Barometer (2016: 17). 
               Table 4-4: Factor contributing to the positive image of China in Africa 
Factors Percentage 
China’s investment in infrastructure other developemt 32% 
Cost of Chinese products 23% 
China’s business investment 16% 
China’s support for the country in international affairs 6% 
Non-interference in the internal affairs of African 
countries 
5% 
Appreciation of the Chinese people culture and language 2% 
None of these 2% 
Some other factor 1% 
Don’t Know 14% 
                   Source: Afro Barometer Survey (2016: 19).  
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This study compares the respondent’s view in seven different countries across Africa to 
further break this down into country by country. Nigeria, South-Africa, Egypt, Kenya, Sudan, 
Tanzania, and Gabon. These countries represent North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central 
Africa, Southern Africa, Horns, and Great Lake regions (see table 4-5). 
      Table 4-5: Factor contributing to the positive image of China in Nigeria 
Factors Countries 
Nigeria South-
Africa 
Egypt Tanzania Sudan Kenya Gabon 
Investment in infrastructure and 
business 
47% 40% 37% 47% 47% 69% 73% 
Cost of products 22% 21% 22% 22% 9% 13% 14% 
Support in international affairs 10% 7% 8% 6% 13% 1% 6% 
Non-interference in internal 
affairs 
6% 4% 5% 5% 14% 4% 5% 
   Source: Afro Barometer Survey (2016:21).  
It is evident from Table 8 that investment in infrastructure has been a major defining factor 
promoting China’s influence in Africa. Zeng Aiping and Shu Zhan (2018: 97) said that as of 2017, 
China has successfully invested in 6,200 kilometers of railways and 6,500-kilometer road 
construction projects, 20 seaports, and bridges, 80 power plant projects, 200 schools, and 80 
stadium construction across Africa. These projects include the new African Union building in 
Addis Ababa built by the Chinese in 2012 and presented as a gift to African leaders. China offered 
the same gesture in 2018 when Beijing promised $31.6 million to West African leaders to build a 
new headquarter building in Abuja. These projects are all embedded in China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) in Africa. To mention a few, the Djibouti multi-purpose port in Doraleh, the 
Mombasa-Nairobi standard gauge railway in Kenya, the Uganda Karuma hydropower project, the 
Djibouti-Ethiopia railway, Suez Canal economic zone, the Khartoum-port railway in Sudan, the 
Addis Ababa light rail, the Benguela railway in Angola among others (Belt and Road Initiative, 
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2020). China has also made a robust diplomatic move by extending personal gifts to many African 
leaders. Burundi, for instance, got a donation of US$22 million presidential palace building from 
Beijing, Zimbabwe with a gift of US$100 million from the Chinese government for its parliament 
building, and the Liberian leader with a US$66 million donation from President Xi to renovate and 
extend its government complex (Joshua Meservey, 2020). This kind of personal diplomacy is a 
strategy that enables China to build strong ties with many African leaders. These activities speak 
to the principle of a soft power, which is about enticement and attraction. 
However, as impressive as most of these gestures are, the concerning issues about China's 
practice in Africa should not be ignored. Framing the relations to portrays China, the giver, and 
African countries, the receiver would not speak to some realities or events. We should bear in mind 
that every nation operates with specific national interests; China is not different. The outpouring 
of Beijing's financial assistance to Africa cannot go without getting something in return, especially 
from the poor and politically unstable government in Africa. Larry and Lyle (2013) of Rand 
Corporation suggest that China's interest include gaining access to African markets. Respondents 
raised some of these concerns when asked in the Afrobarometer survey to specify which factors 
shaped China’s negative image in Africa. Issues such as quality of China's products, competition 
for local business, extraction of resources and land grabbing, and Chinese behavior are some of 
the concerns identified. Table 4-6 highlighted these factors and revealed respondents' opinions on 
challenges confronting China's image in many countries. This further addresses the study's 
research question on the overview of China-Africa relations. Table 4-7 shows a comparison in 
seven countries on how respondents measure factors shaping China's negative image in their 
countries.   
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         Table 4-6: Factor contributing to the Negative Image of China-Africa Relations 
Factors Percentage 
Quality of China’s products  35% 
Taking jobs or business from locals 14% 
China’s extraction of resources from Africa 10% 
Land grabbing by Chinese individuas or business 7% 
Behaviour of Chinese citizens in the country 6% 
China’s willingness in cooperate with undemocratic rulers 4% 
None of these 4% 
Some other factor 1% 
Don’t Know 17% 
          Source: Afro Barometer Survey (2016: 21) 
        Table 4-7: Factor contributing to the Negative image of China in Nigeria 
Factors Countries 
Nigeria South-
Africa 
Egypt Tanzania Sudan Kenya Gabon 
Quality of Products 38% 42% 26% 37% 22% 45% 36% 
Taking Job from the 
locals 
10% 14% 26% 19% 23% 10% 19% 
Extraction of 
Resources 
10% 4% 4% 7% 8% 6% 22% 
Land Grabbing 5% 5% 9% 7% 11% 5% 10% 
          Source: Afro Barometer Survey (2016:21) 
The challenges from the table above should form part of the narrative about China-Africa 
relations. The study believes scholars should focus more on the relations’ challenges to provide 
broader and balanced perspectives. Beijing’s lavishness on African leaders and the investment in 
infrastructure, and economic assistance should be measured against what China and the Chinese 
are getting out of Africa.  This project believes most of these concerns are better to analyze at the 
country level by focusing on each sector and sub-sector of the economy. Nigeria, the case study of 
this project, from table 4-7, respondents recognize the quality of products as a factor creating 
negative for China. The same percentage for the rest of the countries apart from Sudan, who sees 
taking jobs away from the locals, is more problematic. 
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Concentrating on China’s generosity toward Africa could take away focus on the reality of 
China’s activities and national interest. Aside from the international cooperation, a robust 
relationship between Beijing and African leaders with all the gifts would give more leeway to 
access the untapped markets in Africa by the Chinese entrepreneurs and secure more businesses 
in various sectors. Therefore, the next section of the chapter will focus more on Nigeria’s aspect 
of the relations, particularly how the concerns raised in Table 4-7 impact the textile industry in 
northern Nigeria. Analysis at a country level that focuses on the quality of products, job loss, 
resource extraction, and land grabbing is essential to draw a correlation between what African 
countries are deriving or giving up as China expands its activities in the continent. Also, to know 
how China’s policy engagement impacts each sector of the economy, in this case, the textile 
industry and how the people of northern Nigeria is affected.  
4.3 China-Nigeria Investment Cooperation 
Nigeria is one of China’s trading partners and export destinations in Africa, as revealed in 
the literature review. Since the establishment of FOCAC, Nigeria-China relations have improved 
tremendously with the various trade agreements between them. Nigeria has become a destination 
for Chinese investors, and a lot of capital flow from Beijing through FOCAC and BRI project into 
Nigeria. Like many other African countries, Nigeria and China have signed several corporate 
agreements to promote cooperation and investment. Table 4-8 shows Nigeria-China bilateral 
agreements signed from 2001 to 2013. 
  
        Table 4-8: Bilateral Trade Agreement between Nigeria and China 2001 to 2013 
Year  Nature of Agreement  
2001 Agreement on trade, investment promotion and protection (TIP) signed on August 
2001.  
2002 agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
with respect to taxes on income signed on April 2002 
2002 on Strengthening Management of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and 
Diversion of Precursor Chemical signed on July 2002 
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2002 Agreement on Consular Affairs and Tourism Cooperation signed in July 2002 
2006 Memorandum of Understanding on strategic partnership between Beijing and Abuja 
first of Kind in Africa 
2006 Agreement to Promote Investment cooperation between the Ministry of Commerce of 
Nigeria and China signed on February 2006 
2006 Agreement on Economic Cooperation between Nigeria and Guangdong Xinguang 
International Group of China signed on March 2006 
2013 Agreement between Nigeria ministry of industry, trade and investment and that of 
China to promote investment in Automobile, Exhibition Centers, Construction of 
Industrial Zone and Eco-Agriculture Zone signed on July 2013 
       Sources: Akoh, I. A. (2014: 67); Ogunkola O. et al. (2008: 3) and Taylor. (2007) 
 Most of these agreements are more on investment and economic corporation between the 
two countries. It is a different direction than the argument made earlier about the United States, 
focusing more institutions that promote democracy and good governance. The memorandum of 
understanding of strategic partnership signed in 2006 might suggest why Nigeria is vital to China’s 
national interest in Africa, including market penetration and designated as China export 
destination. The Chinese investment tracker shows that in 2018 Nigeria accounted for “one-quarter 
of concentration” of Chinese investment in sub-Saharan Africa (see figure 4-1), and at the FOCAC 
summit 2015, Beijing “pledged” five of the US$60 billion concessional loan package for Africa to 
Nigeria (Brookings Institute, 2018). China made a similar commitment with US$5 billion worth 
of investment to the Lekki, Lagos Trade Zone, one of the many Trade Zones established by China 
in Africa received (Taylor, 2007). 
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                        Figure 4-1: China’s Investment and location in Africa 
                                                     
Source: Brookings Institute (2018)                                                      
Nigeria is one of the beneficiaries of both FOCAC and belt and road projects in Africa, 
which cut across cities like Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, Calabar, and Abuja. Table 4-9 shows some of 
these projects and the year of construction.  
             Table: 4-9| FOCAC/BRI Infrastructural Projects in Nigeria 
Projects Year Cost US$ 
Lagos- Kano Railway 2006 8.3 billion 
Divided  
Into three 
Segment 
Abuja-Kaduna Segment 2009 874 million 
Lagos-Ibadan Segment 2014 1.2 billion 
Kano-Kaduna Segment 2017 1.2 billion 
Lagos-Calabar Railway 2016 11 billion 
Abuja Rail Mass Transit Phase II 2018 824 million 
          Source: Belt and Road Initiative (2020); Yunnan Chen (2018) 
The Lagos-Kano railway currently has three segments, as indicated in the table with the 
italic. Other projects handled by the Chinese include the Nigcomsat Satellites launched to space in 
2007 (Belt and Road Initiative, 2020). All these projects are financed by loans from the Exim Bank 
of China and projects contracted to China Civil Engineering Construction Company (CCECC) 
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(Yunnan Chen, 2020). Two issues are fundamental here: first, the investment in infrastructure may 
be a strategic approach by Beijing to perpetuate itself in Africa – we all know infrastructural 
development remains one of the hallmarks of any economy, but it is not a new concept. During 
the colonial era, the colonialist also invested in infrastructure provision in the colonies to stimulate 
development. As pointed out in the literature review, this idea only created more opportunities to 
exploit the colonies’ reaches and better access to the European enterprises for extraction activities. 
The second fact is that these loans and financial aid directly create leeway and access for the 
Chinese companies to engaged and secure businesses in most African countries with BRI projects. 
Data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics revealed a steady increase in the Chinese 
construction companies’ gross annual revenues in Africa (see figure 4-2).  
Figure 4-2: The Gross Annual Earning of Chinese Construction Companies in Africa from 
1998 to 2018. 
 
            Source: CARI (2020) 
The economic cooperation and bilateral trade agreement with China have made Nigeria to 
source for more Chinese manufacturing products such as electronics, parts, and accessories of 
automobile and motorcycles, wall tiles, herbicides, generators with CK engines, aluminum plate, 
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and sheet, and base stations in telecommunication industry among other materials (Akoh, 2014: 
69). China enjoys more market share and a better trade balance with Nigeria. The trade situation 
is similar in South Africa and Egypt (see table 4-10,4-11&4-13). Overall, the value of trade 
between China and Africa in 2018 was US$185 billion, with China exporting above US$100 
billion to Africa with Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, the “largest buyer” of Chinese products 
(CARI, 2020). Therefore, Africa may be a naturally endowed continent, but Beijing's interest is 
more than just natural resources. A larger share of African markets is a real target, irrespective of 
the assistance offering the continent. 
     Table 4-10: Nigeria Exports/Imports and Trade Balance with China | 2008-2018 
Year Exports to China 
(US$ Thousand) 
Partner 
Share 
(%) 
Imports from China 
(US$ Thousand ) 
Partner 
Share 
(%) 
Trade Balance 
(US$ Thousand) 
 2018 $1,039,790.00 1.67% $8,348,841.49 19.41% $-7,309,051.49 
 2017 $721,261.18 1.62% $5,847,733.76 18.70% $-5,126,472.58 
 2016 $470,985.85 1.43% $6,922,913.27 21.67% $-6,451,927.42 
 2014 $1,669,691.44 1.62% $10,201,900.15 21.92% $-8,201,900.15 
 2013 $1,110,437.36 1.23% $9,679,426.51 21.70% $-8,568,989.15 
 2012 $8,038,724.05 5.62% $7,715,360.74 21.51% $323,363.31 
 2011 $2,527,021.65 2.01% $9,447,756.75 14.77% $-6,920,735.10 
 2010 $1,440,809.16 1.66% $7,324,398.63 16.56% $-5,883,589.47 
 2009 $716,921.11 1.44% $5,999,531.63 17.69% $-5,282,610.52 
 2008 $268,092.96 0.33% $4,292,323.79 15.22% $-4,292,323.79 
    Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (2018) 
 
 
    Table 4-11: Egypt Exports/Imports and Trade Balance with China | 2008-2018 
Year Exports to the U.S. 
(US$ Thousand) 
Partner 
Share 
(%) 
Imports from the 
U.S. (US$ Thousand) 
Partner 
Share 
(%) 
Trade Balance 
(US$ Thousand) 
 2018 $1,040,288.34 3.54% $11,517,084.05 14.22% $-10,476,795.71 
 2017 $679,853.90 2.62% $8,105,328.51 12.22% $-7,425,474.61 
 2016 $495,031.17 2.20% $7,554,202.56 13.01% $-7,059,171.39 
 2015 $442,609.25 2.01% $9,775,826.90 13.15% $-9,333,217.65 
 2014 $329,922.51 1.23% $8,057,648.56 11.30% $-7,727,726.05 
 2013 $559,999.90 1.95% $7,002,779.40 10.50% $-6,442,779.50 
 2012 $747,099.45 2.54% $6,590,725.12 9.43% $-5,843,625.67 
 2011 $623,341.01 1.97% $5,708,258.19 9.17% $-5,084,917.18 
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 2010 $431,595.77 1.64% $4,901,782.80 9.25% $-4,470,187.03 
       Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (2018) 
 
 
    Table 4-12: South Africa Exports/Imports and Trade Balance with China | 2008-2018 
Year Exports to the U.S. 
(US$ Thousand) 
Partner 
Share 
(%) 
Imports from the 
U.S. (US$ 
Thousand) 
Partner 
Share 
(%) 
Trade Balance 
(US$ Thousand) 
 2018 $8,550,852.95 9.14% $17,087,385.97 18.45% $-8,536,533.02 
 2017 $8,672,254.68 9.83% $15,231,696.05 18.33% $-6,599,441.37 
 2016 $6,812,080.88 9.19% $13,536,720.18 18.11% $-6,724,639.30 
 2015 $7,420,282.08 9.24% $15,671,111.09 18.33% $-8,250,829.01 
 2014 $8,770,889.95 9.47% $15,439,064.04 15.47% $-6,668,174.09 
 2013 $12,047,235.76 12.67% $15,987,394.43 15.48% $-3,940,158.67 
 2012 $10,320,513.92 10.44% $14,615,565.22 14.03% $-4,295,051.30 
 2011 $12,495,813.86 11.57% $14,207,815.53 13.82% $-1,712,001.07 
 2010 $8,095,827.24 9.80% $11,501,074.10 13.84% $-3,405,246.86 
     Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (2018) 
As can be seen from the three tables above, China enjoys more market share and trade 
surplus, arguably with the three biggest economies in Africa, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt. 
These tables may also imply that Beijing’s economic aid to Africa goes hand in hand with African 
markets' penetration and turning the major countries in the continent to an export destination for 
Chinese products.  
We can better understand this partnership by looking at the practice of China’s state and 
the Chinese enterprises in Africa. Then what opportunity the relationships is offering the local 
businesses. If Chinese companies are very active and engaging by shipping more of their products 
to Nigeria, it could only mean competition for local smaller-scale firms, especially textile factories 
in Nigeria's northern region.  
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4.3.1 The Impact of Cost and Quality of Chinses Textile Industry in Northern Nigeria  
As earlier suggested, to have a broader perspective into the China-Africa relations, some 
of the concerns raised deserve attention. By understanding these concerns through Chinese practice 
and activities in various sectors, in this case, the textile industry in Nigeria. The partnership 
between Beijing and Abuja created opportunities for the Chinese to be more active in Nigeria with 
a better market share. The factors on focus here: cost and quality of textiles from China. The 
analysis will reflect the satisfaction people are getting and the competition local firms are facing. 
The aim is not to wrap around China all issues of the textile industry in northern Nigeria. Still, the 
studies believe that the impact of trade agreements and partnerships with China should manifest 
in this critical sector, like the textile industry and in a region that needs more attention.  
The study has shown that economic cooperation with China brought more Chinese 
investment and infrastructure projects to Nigeria. It has also provided more ground for Chinese 
businesses to operate in Nigeria, enjoying more percentage of the import’s market share. Nigeria 
buys more of China’s goods and services, which means the country is paying more, resulting in 
many years of trade deficit with China, as shown in Table 4-10 above. 
One sector affected by this high imports is the textile industry. It was once a vibrant sector 
in Nigeria and critical to the economy of northern Nigeria. The current reality is that the textile 
markets in two prominent states in the region, Kano and Kaduna, largely depend on China's cheap 
textile materials. Data from the WITS of the World Bank revealed that textile materials from China 
dominate Nigerian textile markets. Figure 4-3 compares the top five import partners of Nigeria in 
textiles and share of the imports. 
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Figure 4-3: Nigeria Textiles and Clothing and Footwears Imports | Top Five Countries| 2000-
2018  
Textiles and Clothing                                                          Footwears 
   
                                            Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (2018) 
It is a clear shift from what it was in the 1970s and 1980s when the home textile industries 
are capable of meeting the demand for local consumption and selling to neighboring countries, 
which now depends on supply from China to meet domestic demand. So, going back to the two 
factors guiding this section, the cost and quality of products, which are issues shaping china’s 
image in Nigeria. Perhaps, it is convenient and cheaper to import textiles from China than other 
countries than to produce in Nigeria. Alternatively, this is just a way of reciprocating China’s 
investment and financial assistance in Nigeria. Indeed, this is not a good scenario for the home 
industries facing competition from well-funded Chinese companies. The local factories that should 
be benefiting from China’s investment in infrastructures in Nigeria are running out of business, 
paving ways for more supplies from China. Figure 4-4 shows how the import of textiles increases 
in Nigerian markets, and the exports shrank and disappears. This paper is not claiming imports or 
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competition from China are solely responsible for the home-based textile industries’ devastating 
state but provides a context to how China’s relationship with Nigeria is beyond the concessional 
loans or economic and infrastructure assistance. Moreover, whether China might be taking 
advantage of Nigeria’s troubles to advance its national interest to dominate markets, this scenario 
is not peculiar to Nigeria; the Chinese textiles and clothing have also dominated Sub-Saharan 
African markets since 2000 (see figure 4-5). 
Figure 4-4: Nigeria Textiles and Clothing and Footwears Exports | Top Five Countries| 2000-
2018  
Textiles and Clothing                                                           Footwears 
                                                             
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Figure 4-5: Sub-Saharan AfricaTextiles and Clothing | Imports amd Exports | Top Five 
Countries| 2000-2018  
Textile and Clothing Imports                               Textiles and Clothing Exports
                                                                
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (2018) 
4.3.2 The Chinese Textile in Northern Nigeria 
Northern Nigeria is one of the regions that felt the impact of mass importation of textiles 
from China. The Central Bank of Nigeria, quoted in Murtala et al. (2018:44), revealed a steady 
increase in textiles from China to the Kano market. It shows the market share of Nigeria import 
partners from 1985 to 2015 (see figure 4-6). It confirmed the Kano State Trader Union (KSTU) 
assertion in 2015 that Chinese textiles accounted for ninth-one percent of market share value while 
local products share just four percent (Murtala, 2018: 77).   
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                            Figure 4-6: Imported Textiles to Kano from 1985-2015 
 
                                      Source: Central Bank of Nigeria in Murtala et al., (2018:44) 
          Kano state is known as the gateway for Chinese investors to enter the northern textile 
industry. Most of the textile materials for distributors in Kaduna state come from Kano. (Waiwada 
and Renne, 2013:186). Kano is a state that uses its “long meter of textile items” better than other 
states in Nigeria and is highly populated. China turns Kano to a textiles’ distribution center for the 
West Africa sub-region. (Murtala, 2018:75&77). The unrestricted access to the market might be 
responsible for this due to the Nigerian government’s policy and program. In 2010, the government 
withdrew the ban placed on the import of foreign textiles in Nigeria. This decision came when 
most of the mills in both Kaduna and Kano are in comatose. The result led to more foreign textiles 
into the markets because the local factories are out of production—seven textile mills are listed in 
both Kano and Kaduna states in 2008 to be operating with limited capacity. While sixteen are out 
of operation just a year before the ban on foreign textiles was lifted (see Table 4-13 &4-14), a 
contrast to the industry’s strength in the two states in the 1970s and 1980s, as described in the 
problem definition. The lack of production activities increases the demand for foreign textile 
materials to satisfy local needs, and China became the source because it is cheap. It would be 
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impossible not to imagine that Beijing’s beneficence to Nigeria influence the government’s 
decision to rescind the ban on foreign textiles, which suit Chinese factories to push more of their 
products into Nigerian textile markets. 
Table 4-13: Seven Textile Mills Operating in North-West, Northern Nigeria with number of 
employment, December 2008 
S/N Factories No. of Unionized Workers  
1 Funtua Textiles, Funtua  300 
2 Angel Spinning and Dyeing, Kano 1000 
3 Nigerian Spinning and Dyeing Ltd, Kano 500 
4 Lakhi/ Jaykay Carpet Ltd, Kano 50 
5 Africa Textile Manufacturing Ltd, Kano 1000 
6 Chellco Industries Ltd, Kaduan 100 
7 Terytex Nigeria Ltd, Kano 300 
 Total 3250 
      Source: Gado and Nmadu (2011: 92) 
         Table 4-14: Textile Mills on Shutdown in Kaduna and Kano as at 2009  
         Kaduna          Kano  
1 United Nigeria Textile Ltd  Bagauda Textile Mills Limited 
2 SRC Industries Limited  Kano Textile Priners Limited  
3 SRC Industries Limited  Dangote Textiles Mills Limited 
4 Arewa Textiles Universal Testile Industries Limited 
5 Supertex Limited Gaskiya Textile Mills, Limited  
6 Blanket Manufacturing Co. Limited Holborn Nigeria Textile Limited 
7 Finetex Limited Magraps Textiles Mill Limited 
 8 Textile Limited  
9 Unitex Limited  
         Source: (Banjoko et al., 2012:184; Abdulkarim, 2020:123) 
Other reasons advanced are the illegal shipping of textiles and counterfeit products from 
China. The two issues briefly highlighted in the problem definition. At the 2017 conference of the 
Nigerian Textile Manufacturers Association (NTMA), the chairman of the association, Abiodun 
Ogunkoya, said that “about 85 percent of the US$1.4 billion worth of textile materials” in Nigeria 
are smuggled from China annually. He further stated that the “Wax print fabric” has “counterfeit” 
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of made in Nigeria Wax with a fake logo of the Standard Organization of Nigeria (This Day, 2017). 
Murtala (2018:73-74) also revealed that since the establishment of the China-Africa Cooperation 
Forum, fake wax fabrics from China to the Kano market have risen (see figure 4-7). 
                 Figure 4-7: Counterfeit Textiles from China to Kano market in Percentage  
 
                             Source: Kano State Traders Union, 2015 in Murtala (2018:75) 
          The counterfeit products reflect the concerns shared by the respondents in the Afrobarometer 
survey shaping the negative China image in Nigeria. The Counterfeit Wax fabric textiles from 
China are what local factories used to produce. The Chinese stole the concept from Nigeria, took 
it to their textile factories in China to produce similar materials for the Nigerian markets. Up to 
“sixteen factories” in China work on this stolen design to create textiles with a “made in Nigeria” 
logo. It happens at a time when the Nigerian textile industry is experiencing zero production. 
(Burgis, 2015: 67-68).  
In terms of practice, the unrestricted access makes the Chinese openly engage in retail 
activities in the Kano and Kaduna markets with cheap textile products even when Nigerian law 
prohibits foreigners from retail trading in textiles. With most local textile industries out of 
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operation, many textiles, clothing, and footwear dealers in Kano, Kaduna, and Zaire invariably 
have to deal directly with the Chinese. (Murtala, 2018:73; Waiwada and Renne, 2013:187). British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that in 2012 about forty-five Chinese arrested for 
engaging in retail trading in the Kano market. The government officials accused them of 
“scavenging in the market,” which does hurt the Kano economy (BBC, 2012). In 2015, officials 
of the Nigerian customs service raided “seventy-five” warehouses in Kano markets suspected of 
harboring illegal textiles from China. This illegal act involves many Chinese business personnel 
and local distributors (Hassan, 2020: 143). This influx is in no way helping local industries. The 
firms have to compete with the well-funded Chinese firms, and the Nigerians, on the other hand, 
accepting the low-quality Chinese products.      
There were other textile sources into Northern markets, but China became the top supplier 
of textiles and footwear after FOCAC was launched. Local textile organizations are not silent about 
this. For instance, the Kano Dyers Association in 2015 organized a protest against the Chinese 
imitation of Hausa (one of the dominant groups in northern Nigeria) fabric design and “invasion 
and dominance” of the tie and dye business in the state. The association's secretary said if the 
Chinese continue to bring their textiles to the market without a check, many local dyers’ businesses 
would be out of operation because dyers from China are cheaper and more affordable for people 
than those made locally. In the same year, a memorandum of understanding was signed between 
the Kano state government and the traders, both Chinese and locals, to stop the Chinese traders 
from bringing “ready-made dye materials” to Kano. (Hassan, 2020:145). From a cultural 
viewpoint, this may be eroding the culture and tradition as people begin to lose touch with the 
peculiarity of tie and dye made in northern Nigeria. 
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The anti-business environment has also helped to collapse the textile industry in Nigeria, 
from the political leaders' poor economic decision past and present, high level of corruption, and 
mismanagement of Nigerian fortune. If the government appropriately managed the gains from oil 
proceeds over the years, it is enough to build the economy. However, the greediness among the 
politicians has created a dark cloud over Nigeria. Who can blame China? Every nation exists to 
advance and protect its national interest. If China established the Bank of China to support Chinese 
businesses abroad, Nigeria could equally implement policies that protect its domestic industries. 
Utomi (2008) opined that because of Beijing’s financial favors, the Nigerian government 
manipulated tariffs to encourage Chinese imports, leading to the dumping of low-priced and 
substandard products in the market an unhealthy competition for domestic products. 
A prominent stakeholder in Kaduna state, Matthew Hassan Kukah, once remarked that the 
Kaduna textile industry’s collapse had “drained the life from the city,” that people in the 1970s 
were very “energetic.” Joblessness has created ethnic and religious identities between the Muslim 
population in the northern Kaduna and the Southern Kaduna’s Christian population. Stating that 
the collapse made northern Nigeria “an incubator of poverty” as violence become the “tenor of 
life.” He concluded that even if the government put the necessary resources to revive the textile 
industry in northern Nigeria, the Chinese textiles have spread through the market that the local 
industries would not compete (Burgis, 2015: 66-67).    
The Nigerian government recognizes the devastating effects of foreign textiles on the local 
factories costing the country a considerable fortune on importing textile and textile materials 
annually. This reality pushes the Nigerian President in 2019 to mandate immediate intervention of 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to assist the local manufacturers of textiles. The CBN promised 
an N100 billion intervention fund for cotton, textile, and garment production within Nigeria (This 
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Day, 2019). Part of the intervention policy includes a “single-digit interest rate loan was also 
proposed to help the local producers secure more funds to expand their operation (Vanguard, 
2019). These are all general government attempts to address the textile industry issues, which, if 
properly implemented, could benefit northern Nigeria. 
4.4 China Expansion in Africa  
This study believes the economic crisis from the structural adjustment programs that 
bewildered many African countries in the 1980s and 1990s played a vital role. It provided a 
strategic opportunity for China to fast track its relations with African countries as a better 
alternative after the failed capitalists approach. More so, the Chinese are no stranger to the northern 
markets. For instance, at the United Nigeria Limited, a textile mill in Kaduna, many Chinese were 
there in the 1980s, working because the Hong Kong Textile firm owned the mill. Same for Kano 
state, who in the 1970s saw a gradual influx of the Chinese into the city. More and more Chinese 
people move their textiles to Kano, especially the Kantin Kwari market. (Hassan, 2020: 137; 
Maiwada and Renne, 2013:181; Murtala, 2018:74). 
Presumably, the Chinese understand the informal activities in the African economy. Most 
developing countries operate an informal economy system that largely relies on informal market 
activities that are self-reliant and self-regulating with less government bureaucracy. Spring-up in 
most urban areas across developing countries after the economic fall-out of the structural 
adjustment program as public jobs disappear, weak institutions, and poor leadership lack attention 
to people’s needs. Redundancy and high unemployment in urban cities result from the rural-urban 
drift that increases the demand for goods and services because of the over-concentration of people 
with little consumption income. It is a survival market for desperate people with little or no choice 
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than to shop for low cost and low-quality products. (Kristina, 2004; Neuwirth, 2011). Thus, more 
reason that Chinese products are desirable in Africa. 
  Engaging the informal markets across Africa and the rest of the developing countries 
significantly helps China become the “world’s manufacturing and trading center” (Neuwirth, 
2011:25). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) revealed that 
half of the world workforce of about 1.8 billion people worked in the informal sector and projected 
that by 2020, “two-thirds” of the world workers would be employed in the informal sector 
(Neuwirth, 2011:18-19). Perhaps, China understands this, the reason for the Chinese influx to 
Africa for work, trade, and investment. This move was also aided by the Bank of China, dedicated 
to providing financial assistance to the Chinese entrepreneurs seeking opportunities in Africa. 
Thus, they overcame the anti-business environment like poor infrastructures and inadequate power 
supply in most African countries. 
In the area of infrastructural provision, there are tangible facts to suggest that economic 
development assistance from China has helped promote development across the continent, but it 
has equally opened up Africa to the Chinese with unrestricted access. In a nutshell, China is reaping 
from its investment in Africa. 
4.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the studies focused on China-Africa relations, in general, examined Nigeria 
the implication of Nigeria trade relations with China and its effects on the textile industry in the 
country, especially northern Nigeria, with Kaduna and Kano as focus center.  The survey and data 
from Afro-Barometer and World Integrated Trade Solution are critical information sources that 
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anchor this chapter. The next chapter summarizes the findings and how it connects to research 
questions raised by this project, recommendations, and conclusions. 
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Chapter Five 
Summary of Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
This study’s primary purpose was to understand China’s policy engagement in Africa 
through its activities in the textile industry in northern Nigeria with facts and figures from Kano 
and Kaduna states, Nigeria. This chapter presents the summary and primary findings in chapter 
four and the literature review in chapter two. The chapter has three parts: the summary of findings, 
recommendations expecting to guide future research into China-Africa relations, and the 
conclusion.   
5.2 Summary of Findings   
The study revealed that China’s economic assistance and investment in infrastructure, 
businesses, and affordable manufacturing products contributed to China’s positive image and 
influence in Africa. Data available to this study under section 4.2 in Chapter four revealed that, on 
average, 56 percent of respondents from 35 countries in Africa viewed the economic development 
assistance favorably from Beijing compared to 19 percent who think it is not good. For instance, 
in Nigeria, the section revealed that investment in infrastructures 47 percent, affordable Chinese 
products 22 percent, and 10 percent for support at international affairs are factors shaping China's 
positive.  Under this section, the study identified factors such as the quality of products from China, 
competition with local firms in the manufacturing sector, extraction of resources, land grabbing, 
and the Chinese’s behavior as challenges confronting China-Africa relations. In countries like 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, the low quality of China's manufacturing products and 
competition for the local firms top their most concerns. The study further revealed that China’s 
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diplomacy, with most African leaders patronizing them with personal gifts, might be responsible 
for Beijing’s strong influence. This review answered the research question on the significance and 
challenges of China-Africa relations. 
China’s economic cooperation and financial assistance to Africa have also created 
opportunity zones for Chinese personnel to explore the African construction and manufacturing 
industry. Thus, increasing trade value, market share, and favorable trade balance for China in the 
continent, especially with Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, section 4.3 Chapter four. These 
opportunity zones include the textile market in northern Nigeria. Data available to this study in 
section 4.3.1 of Chapter four revealed that most Sub-Saharan African countries relied on textile 
materials from China for their domestic consumption with close to US$4 billion of imported 
Chinese textiles and clothing in 2018 compared to US$170 million worth of textiles the continent 
exported in the same year. Nigeria and Nigerians also rely on China for their textiles and clothing 
and footwear. 
The study under section 4.3.2 Chapter four shows Chinese textiles dominated Kano and 
Kaduna markets. The section revealed that Chinese textiles accounted for 91 percent of the market 
share value in the Kano market, while local products share 4 percent of the market’s textiles in 
2015. Importing cheap textiles from Chinese became an obvious choice to satisfy domestic needs. 
The study suggested that the government’s decision to rescind the ban on foreign textiles in 2010 
increases imports from China, creating more competition for the local factories. The study suggests 
this decision could have been reached by the Nigerian government to clear every trade obstacle 
for the Chinese to access the Nigerian market in return for more Beijing financial support because 
analysis shows that most of the domestic mills in Kano and Kaduna no longer in operation and the 
few that are working are on a limited capacity. The Chinese's stealing of Nigerian fabric led to 
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many fake indigenous textiles products in Kano and Kaduna. Section 4.3.2 shows that China’s 
fake textiles have been on the increase in Kano since the launch of FOCAC in 2000. It amounted 
to 86 percent of total fake textiles in the Kano market in 2014.  
The study argues in section 4.4 of Chapter four that China capitalized on the informal 
system of most African economies to expand its reach and dominance in various markets through 
bilateral trade agreements, which enabled the Chinese to flooded markets with their cheap 
manufacturing products for the African population who desire these products because of their low 
consumption budget.   
The section 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.4 under Chapter four answered the research questions three 
and four by providing information on China’s policy in the textile industry in northern Nigeria. 
Most of the data presented are from 2000 to 2018; the data connected the Beijing soft power 
diplomacy in Africa since the FOCAC. The study is some areas lack sufficient statistical data to 
establish the effect of the poverty level in northern Nigeria to the influx of Chinese textile in the 
region and the role of the textile industry and unemployment level in northern Nigeria. The study 
used explanatory narrative based on government officials’ statements, representation of various 
textile associations, and arguments from existing literature to establish its objectives. The research 
question two was sufficiently detailed in the problem statement.  
5.3 Recommendations  
This study focuses on the textile industry in northern Nigeria to expand on China’s strategic 
interest in Africa. This focus must extend to other sectors, such as agriculture, transportation, oil 
and gas, and services because understanding the reality in each economic area would help 
policymakers in Africa to be more pragmatic in their trade policy approach not just for China but 
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capitalists and former colonialists seeking economic and political cooperation. Its national interest 
in the continent guides China’s policy toward Africa. African countries must wake up to this 
reality. They must also prioritize their national interest through strategic trade policy.  
Nigeria must also start encouraging and relying more on its research institutes to formulate 
its trade policy. They can offer suggestions based on empirical studies to help the government 
make an informed decision on bilateral trade agreements or economic policy. Centers such as 
China, European, American, and Asia studies should be encouraged in elite universities across 
Nigeria to further understand China’s national strategy. 
No matter the volume, Beijing’s economic assistance would amount to nothing without 
solid economic planning to stimulate home industries. The textile industry could be a catalyst in 
adjusting the trade deficit and improve the Nigerian trade value with China. Nigeria is a mono-
economic nation that relies on crude oil for its foreign earnings. A shift in focus to the textile sector 
would be a genuine attempt on diversification of the economy.  
The study already highlighted some Nigerian government plans to curb the influx of 
textiles; the country can do more through a cotton production initiative, especially in northern 
Nigeria. Cotton farmers would welcome a government-financed irrigation system that supplies 
water throughout the year. It is an initiative that would impact the grassroots rather than white 
elephant projects that create more debt to the country. The local industries will benefit from it and 
could serve in the long-run as a source of foreign earnings. Lastly, nothing can work in a country 
where the leaders are inept and corrupt. There is a need for fiscal accountability in government 
and transparent for Africa to progress. 
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5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter summarizes the key research findings and how they relate to the questions 
raised by this study. It provides some suggestions that focus on future research on China-Africa 
relations and priorities that African policymakers must consider in trade negotiation and policy 
decisions. China is in Africa to stay and vigorously pursuing national interests like other major 
powers. It is on the leaders to guide themselves with reliable information and practical idea that is 
futuristic, that evaluates every trade agreement before a decision and that protect the home 
industries. 
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